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CHAPTER 6 
THE MARKET FOR LOYALTIES AND THE 
USES OF COMPARATIVE MEDIA LAW 
Monroe E. Price 
We have seen in the previous chapter the use of foreign mod­
els and comparative media law in several areas important to the 
drafting of the Indian Broadcasting Bill. These included the licens­
ing of satellite broadcasting services, the licensing of DTH provid­
ers, requiring in-country uplinking, the level of foreign equity 
required for certain kinds of providers, and cross-media owhership 
restrictions. We also observed certain methodological problems in­
volved in conducting comparative studies and in gathering, inter­
preting, and presenting data. 
This chapter provides a theoretical perspective on the use of 
media law models in such a compju-ative effort. We pursue the 
question posed in the introduction: is media law so country spe­
cific, so tied to the mores, history, political structure, regulatory 
style, and state of the creative industry in a particular place that 
influences from other contexts are only marginally helpful? Or, on 
the contrary, is media law, especially in international societies, so 
much a part of an increasingly transnational whole that any at­
tempt at identifying sharp local differences, unique in style and 
outcome, is virtually doomed? 
I. THE MARKET FOR LOYALTIES 
I have attempted to develop an explanatory approach for 
many examples of media legislation in my book. Television: the 
Public Sphere and National Identity.^ I made the general and ex­
pansive claim that all broadcast regulation is an effort within a soci­
ety to maintain or adjust a cartel, and not just a cartel of 
businesses, but one involving the dominant mix of political views 
and cultural attitudes. I posited that, while such legislation was 
often justified in terms of preserving or strengthening national 
identity, national identity was, at bottom, the set of political views 
1 MONROE E. PRICE, TELEVISION: THE PUBUC SPHERE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 
(1995). 
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and cultural attitudes which could maintain the existing power 
structure. I suggested that, while there were several ways to define 
"national identity," including a discovery of the "true" or "his­
toric" national identity of a state, this slightly cynical definition 
(one defined by the power structure so as to maintain its power) 
enhances our understanding of media legislation from a compara­
tive approach. 
If this is true, if broadcast regulation can be seen in this light, 
then the project of broadcast reform, such as the current reform 
undertaken in India, takes on new meaning. Broadcast reform 
would be necessary in a state either if: (1) the existing set of broad­
casting laws is inadequate at performing the cartelization function; 
or (2) the "national identity" has changed or is changing and legis­
lation is necessary to legitimate the new players and, in turn, to 
protect them against unregulated challenge. A variation on the 
second premise posits: sharp challenges to the status quo can only 
be absorbed by opening the system to new players or, put differ­
ently, it is only by discussing the possibility of broadcast reform 
and the hope of expanded entry that the existing cartel can main­
tain its dominant regulatory position.^ 
In the Indian context, the issue of cartelization has always 
loomed large. The Broadcasting Bill, after all, is partly about legit­
imating, for the first time, competitive private terrestrial broadcast­
ers who might challenge the relative Doordarshan monopoly. The 
Indian debate, as well, has concerned the very structure of Door­
darshan and its relationship to the Government. While this is not 
an issue in the draft Broadcasting Bill, it is very much part of the 
reform agenda as indicated by the decision of the Government to 
implement the Prasar Bharati Act, thus providing more autonomy 
to Doordarshan. 
2 In developing a framework for comparative analysis of European media policy mak­
ing, Karen Siune, et al., defined policy making as "a reaction to a challenge, a reaction that 
is intended to find a reasonable balance between 'forces of change' and 'forces of preserva­
tion'." They also stated that "[i]n the current process of adaptation to technological pro­
gress public action strategies in most European countries may seem to be a reaction to the 
risk of disintegration, especially in cultural matters, in the broadest sense." This logic can 
also be noticed at the Indian level and underlines partly the concept of the market for 
loyalties. NEW MEDIA POLITICS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES IN WESTERN EUROPE ch. 2 
(Dennis McQuail & Karen Siune eds., 1986). 
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A. Examples of the Market for Loyalties 
Before turning further to India, some examples of media stat­
utes reflecting national identity in this cartelized sense may be use­
ful. In Italy, the very architecture of public service broadcasting m 
the early 1990s reveals a conscious design to accommodate the sys­
tem of political parties, with Christian Democrats controlling the 
first channel. Socialists the second, and the former Communist 
PADS the third.^ In Germany, by constitution and statute, regula­
tion is purposefully inclusive: public broadcasting corporations are 
obliged to adhere to a rule of internal pluralism, enforced by a gov­
erning board, the Rundfunkrat, in which the opinions, values, inter­
ests, and perspectives in the society must be rigorously 
represented.^ The statutory ideal is for broadcasting to mirror soci­
ety's composition, but the consequence has been a rough parceling 
out of licenses among dominant political parties. Specific state 
broadcasting agencies which supervise the private license holders 
must assure the realization of the goal that the entirety of the three 
program channels is pluralistic, i.e., the total of them articulate the 
plurality of opinions and voice the views of the relevant political, 
ideological, and social forces and groups of civil society.^ The same 
is true in Belgium, which has a complex broadcasting system due to 
its different internal cultural and broadcasting policies. The mem­
bers of the governing body of the public service broadcasters are 
appointed by Parliament, and its composition reflects the power of 
the different so-called political pillars (Catholics, Socialists and 
Liberals). Moreover, in an effort to maintain the so-called cultural 
pact" which reflects the "national identity," internal job promo­
tions have not been awarded according to qualifications, but for 
party loyalty.® 
3 For a recent account of the crumbling of this architecture, see Robert Graham FM 
Rules the Airwaves: How Berlusconi Won Control of Broadcasting, FIN. TIMES (London), 
July 2,1994, at 4, available in LEXIS, World Library, Arcnws File; sec also Don Sassoon, 
Italy: The Advent of Private Broadcasting, in THE POLITICS OF BROADCASTING 119 ( ay-
mond Kuhn ed., 1985). 
See generally VINCENT PORTER & SUZANNE HASSELBACH, PLURALISM, PO 
AND THE MARKETPLACE: THE REGULATION OF GERMAN BROADCASTING (1991). 
5 Under an inter-Lander treaty entered into in 1991, the existence of external plural­
ism is presumed if each of three program channels produced in Germany by three different 
private broadcasting corporations and broadcast nationwide can be received by more than 
half the population in Germany. Id. 
6 For a detailed analysis, see JEAN-CLAUDE BURGELMAN, OMROEP EN POLITIEK. HET 
BELGISCH AUDIOVISUEEL OMROEPBESTEL ALS INZET EN RESULTANTE VAN PARTIJPOLI-
TIEKE MACHTSTRATEGIEEN (1990). 
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lUrkey provides another dramatic example of the effort to 
maintain control over competition in the market of loyalties, here 
explicitly in the name of national identity. Since the rise of Kemal 
Ataturk, the Turkish Government — at least until the middle of 
the 1990s when realignment occurred — considered what has been 
called Islamic fundamentalism a threat to the secular state. Advo­
cates of secularism, and certainly those in control of the state prior 
to the mid-1990s, sought to limit the use of the mass media to their 
religious competitors. The Turkish Radio and Television Authority 
("TRT") was not only monopolistic, but was in essence the voice of 
the State, disseminating the unitary ideology and culture of TUrkish 
republicanism; it found itself highly susceptible to government in­
tervention.^ Charged by statute with "promoting the values of 
country, unity, republic, public order, harmony, and welfare and to 
strengthen the principles of Kemal Ataturk's reforms[,]"® TRT has 
been an instrument for eohesiveness in an environment riven by 
alternate national identities. When TRT was attacked for broad­
casting programs that legitimated Islamic fundamentalism, a doc­
trine considered hostile to the secular state, the Agency's Director-
General was forced by the Government to resign.® 
The structure of broadcasting is also related to current views 
concerning federalism and relative autonomy. In Europe, where 
there is an effort to build what Michael Keating has called stateless 
nations, like Catalonia and Scotland,^" broadcasting policy will, 
over time, reflect internal political adjustments. Systems that have 
been tightly controlled from the center, in terms of access of 
images to populations or subsidization of messages of political 
^ See Asu Aksoy & Kevin Robins, Gecekondu-Style Broadcasting in Turkey: A Con­
frontation of Cultural Values, INTERMEDIA, June-July 1993, at 15; see also Haluk Sahin & 
Asu Aksoy, Global Media and Cultural Identity in Turkey, 43 J. COMM. 31 (1992). 
® ELI NOAM, TELEVISION IN EUROPE 258 (1991). 
^ See id. 
At the time of writing, a referendum on devolution in Scotland was scheduled to 
take place. It was, however, expected that devolution, if it happens, would affect broad­
casting in a number of ways. 
All channels will experience change; the BBC will be under pressure to supply 
far more Scottish originated programmes, Scotland's ITV companies will be 
looking to claw back even more sovereignty over their air time and Channels 4 
and 5 will need to improve their Scottish production and extend the diversity of 
representations of Scotland on screen. 
Jane-Ann Purdy, Assembly to Change Channels, SCOTSMAN, May 16,1997, at 29, available 
in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File. All this will be heavily influenced by the machina­
tions of the new Assembly. See id. 
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unity, will give way to more decentralized methods of deciding 
both. 
B. The Market for Loyalties and External Voices 
These examples address the use of law to preserve, adjust, or 
expand a cartel of loyalties internally and render some division of 
that internal market. In the world of "globalization," a major chal­
lenge to any existing cartel can be deemed to come from abroad. 
Indeed, the possibility of such a threat can be used, and certainly 
has historically been used, as a device to build internal support for 
the existing power structure. In the world of easy data and infor­
mation transmission, the external threat can be deemed cultural, 
not military, and ideological, not solely based on force in the tradi­
tional sense." Here, again, the use of a cultural threat is not a new 
one, but it becomes, somehow, universalized. The Indian Broad­
casting Bill, at least those parts that restrict entry by foreign com­
petitors, can be read as an example of the use of cultural threat to 
justify protection of the existing cartel. 
While law has been used in the past to protect internal produ­
cers of national identity from external competition, the effective­
ness of law to accomplish so protective an umbrella is now under 
question. For most of the century, the international order assumed 
that radio transmissions should be contained primarily within the 
boundaries of one nation; the international function was to dis­
pense frequencies so as to assure that these conditions of market 
division were met and enforced.^^ Over the twentieth century, in­
ternational regulations and arrangements were built to reinforce 
the national impulse, to limit broadcasting to indigenous, high-
quality transmissions of good quality within the frontiers of the 
11 The use of a foreign treaty is, of course, a well-known military and political strategy 
countries are using to create internal coherence or to redeem the authority of unpopular 
governments, as first described by the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. In 
the days of the Falklands War, Margaret Thatcher could, for instance, whip up a degree of 
popular support by waving the flag for "our Boys." See BRUCE D. PORTER, WAR AND THE 
RISE OF THE STATE: THE MILITARY FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICS (1994); JOHN 
KEEQAN, A HISTORY OF WARFARE (1993). 
12 One of R.H. Coase's early economic analyses of law showed how regulation in Brit­
ain was used to limit competition from radio signals originating in France and Luxem­
bourg. R.H. CoASE, BRITISH BROADCASTING: A STUDY IN MONOPOLY (1950). What 
became the BBC emerged, in part, as a legal expression of fear that unregulated trans-
border data flow might injure British nationhood. 
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country concerned.^^ In the interludes between great wars, there 
were bilateral and multilateral agreements to control propaganda 
subversive to the state system. For example, the League of Na­
tions-sponsored Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting 
in the Cause of Peace provided: 
The High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to prohibit 
and, if occasion arises, to stop without delay the broadcasting 
within their respective territories of any transmission which to 
the determinant of good intemational understanding is of such a 
character as to incite the population of any territory to acts in­
compatible with the intemal order or the security of a territory 
of a High Contracting Party.^"* 
The 1989 European Broadcast Directive illustrates the evolution in 
Europe from the longstanding approach of exclusion based on na­
tional borders to a common union within the community of mem­
bers based on encouraging free competition for identity while also 
seeking to regulate competition, even if mildly from outside the 
community.^^ In the 1994 GATT negotiations,^^ the EU reserved 
See President Pushes TV Marti; ITU Pushes Back, BROADCASTING, Apr. 9, 1990, at 
37 (discussing message from International Frequency Registration Board, an arm of the 
International Telecommunication Union, to the State Department concerning the legality 
of TV Marti, the American initiative to bring its television to Cuba); see also Steven Ruth, 
Comment, The Regulation of Spillover Transmissions from Direct Broadcast Satellites in 
Europe, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 107 (1989). 
I'* International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of 
Peace, Sept. 23, 1936, art. I, 186 L.N.T.S. 301, 309. Similarly, in the Litvinov Agreement 
the US and the U.S.S.R. both promised not to spread propaganda hostile to the other and 
not to harbor groups working toward the overthrow of the other. Exchange of Communi­
cations Between the President of the United States and Maxim M. Litvinov People's Com­
missar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, reprinted in 28 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 2 (Supp. 1934). 
See generally THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNICATIONS: INTERNATIONAL 
AND EUROPEAN DIMENSIONS (Kenneth Dyson & Peter Humphreys eds., 1990). 
1® The quota measure was especially (e.g., 50% European works) controversial. Imme­
diately after the Broadcasting Directive was formally adopted, the US objected that some 
parts of the measure were contrary to GATT. Shortly thereafter, US officials filed a trade 
complaint with GATT to protest the Directive's quota clause as an "unfair trade practice." 
Responding to the US complaint, the EC argued that the Directive did not come within the 
scope of GATT since, first, GATT rules did not apply to services and, second, the quota 
principle was intended to protect cultural sovereignty and, thus, could well be exempt from 
the usual GATT restrictions. See Kelly L. Wilkins, Recent Development, Television With­
out Frontiers: An EEC Broadcasting Premiere, 14 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 195, 206-07 
(1991). 
Other issues discussed at the 1994 Uruguay Round (GATT), matters in which the US 
regarded the EU as behaving in a discriminatory fashion, were subsidies for the sector and 
the blank tapes levy. At the last moment, the audiovisual sector was removed from GATT 
at the request of, and thus a "victory" for, France and the European audiovisual sector. 
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film and television programming from the general lowering of 
trade barriers on the ground that a European cultural space ought 
to be preserved, strengthened, and protected from the supposed 
Hollywood influx. And Canada, on the one hand, and Malaysia on 
the other, are countries with very different traditions that seek to 
deploy law, or law in conjunction with the structure of the industry, 
in an effort to control the relationship between images from abroad 
and imagery from within. Canada does so in a context in which 
there is already a rather open society; Malaysia does so in a context 
in which televised images from abroad traditionally have been 
tightly controlled. 
Considering all of this together, the old ideal — conformity of 
signal transmission to national borders — has changed in the pe­
riod of ascending globalism. The excitement, the association with 
freedom, the attraction to capital lie with the transnational, the ac­
cumulation of audience and markets. "Space" (the idea of the un-
regulable, open skies), both in terms of the locus for transmission 
and the absence of authority, is said to be replacing "place" (in the 
sense of the national and the regulable). In the 1970s, the United 
Nations discussed principles which would not only bar certain 
kinds of programs from direct broadcast satellites,^^ but would re­
quire consultations with governments whose audiences were 
targeted and, in some exemplars, require national consent for di­
rect broadcast signals that were specifically directed from one state 
to the territory of another. Opposition to radio pirates was ap­
plauded. Twenty years later, though, that is now altered. The ef­
forts of countries to control their information space is questioned 
in terms of emerging international norms. 
The task is to understand which measures, administered in 
what way, represent an acceptable bridge between concepts of 
space and concepts of place. To take an example, prohibitions, or 
restrictive and prohibitive licensing of the ownership of satellite 
dishes, can be viewed as too rigid an interference with the right to 
receive information, especially if it is related to a general effort to 
The EU was not obliged to apply Most Favored Nation status nor to increase market ac­
cess, and the US was free to retaliate. 
17 Such broadcasts included "material publicizing ideas of war, militarism, nazism, na­
tional and racial hatred and enmity between peoples, as well as material which is immoral 
or instigative in nature or is otherwise aimed at interfering in the domestic affairs or for­
eign policy of other States." Preparation of an International Convention on Principles Gov­
erning the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for Direct Television Broadcasting, 
U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 37, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/8771 (1972). 
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foreclose a diversity of sources of information. In some countries, 
law sometimes takes the place of force in achieving a desired cen­
sorious result. 
C. Advertising in the Market for Loyalties 
Regulation of advertising can be used as an example to show 
how this process of controlling information, or using law, operates. 
In a market for loyalties, advocates for disparate national identities 
will predictably have different attitudes toward the use of ordinary 
commercial advertising on television and the kind of Western pro­
gramming that ordinarily accompanies it.^® The preoccupation that 
governments have long had with limiting advertising messages and 
excluding competition from commercial broadcasters suggests that 
the impact of programming on public allegiances yields a substitute 
for more traditional packages of identity. Advertising can per­
suade individuals to consume rather than to save and invest, with 
consequences for particular visions of the public good. In this 
sense, marketers of pure national identities, and ideologies that 
parade as such, compete with sellers of consumer goods who are 
trying to impress the citizen with another identity. Here the ques­
tion is how a person, certainly one in a developed society, decides, 
at the margin, whether a higher or lower percentage of disposable 
income should go to the state (in taxes), say, for education or envi­
ronmental protection (to be generous), or, instead, for personal 
goods like food or television sets or automobiles.^^ In a society of 
poverty, or where there are passionate masses reflecting on how 
their lives should be led, the impact may not be measurable in 
money alone, but in a purer form of sheer human loyalty. 
The effect of advertising and of modem Western-style pro­
gramming in the market for loyalties may also support certain 
groups. Proponents of some identities recognize the indirect, sup­
porting role that the barrage of traditional commercials, for every­
thing from orange juice to computers, might play in connection 
with their own narrations of future happiness. Parties advocating a 
more rapid transition to a marketplace economy in states ambi-
For an understanding of these issues, see STEVEN H. SmFFRns, THE FIRST AMEND­
MENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990). 
19 The notion of elasticity of demand comes into play here. Sellers of ordinary goods 
often want to know whether — and how much — an increase in price will decrease de­
mand for their product. Manufacturers of national identities, including the state itself, 
must (in the economic model) ask the same question. 
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tious to increase their gross national product may see the political 
benefits of a citizenry exposed to the culture of advertising and 
consumerism as containing indirect or secondary messages of polit­
ical significance. That is, apparently, a sufficient explanation for 
the actions of the Narasimha Rao Government in the early 1990s, 
as explained in Professor Sinha's chapter in this volume. 
We see assertions of national identity in the interstices of com­
mercials, in their depiction of idealized home life, opportunities to 
travel, or a certain idea of traditional family values.^" Arguably, 
one message of the sellers of toothpaste and automobiles is the 
claim that the opportunity to have maximum choice to consume is 
good. Those who fashion legislation may temper advertising by re­
stricting television, restricting the content of advertising, or confin­
ing it to certain channels or times. All these steps may reflect — 
though not always — a perceived relationship between advertis­
ing's impact and the nature of the political system. 
If the images of consumer society are supportive of the party 
in power, then that can be ground enough for their advocacy of an 
increase in advertiser-supported broadcasting. Alternatively, a rul­
ing coalition may see the images of advertising and the narratives 
of foreign programs as a threat to its continued hold on govern­
ment.^^ These often-foreign images are then characterized as sub­
versive.^^ It is as if, though this may not always be the case, they 
advocate by the basic aspects of their story lines a view of the indi­
vidual that is wholly at odds with the reigning perspective.^^ These 
dominant forces fear that the successful penetration of the world 
view contained in Western advertising might yield a claim for polit­
ical change.^ The most avid proponents of free market television 
20 See CECELIA TICHI, ELECTRONIC HEARTH: CREATING AN AMERICAN TELEVISION 
CULTURE (1991). 
21 See MARIKA NATASHA TAISHOFF, STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DIRECT BROAD­
CAST SATELLITE 13 (1987). 
22 Hiese images are usually labeled "American" for convenience, though they may 
originate from many sources and from companies that are not controlled by US citizens. 
23 Certainly, in the Islamic world, this is the view of the influence of Western television. 
24 Zhao Shuifu argued that international satellite dissemination conducted by Western 
developed counties threatens the independence and identity of China's national culture, 
which includes loving the motherland, hard work, advocating industry and thrift, taking a 
keen interest in science, attaching importance to culture, and stressing national courage. 
Precisely because of this, according to Shuifu, the infringement of overseas radio and tele­
vision and the influence they bring hampers the expansion of national spirit. Zhao Shuifu, 
Foreign Dominance of Chinese Broadcasting — Will Hearts and Minds Follow?, IN­
TERMEDIA, Apr.-May 1994, at 8. 
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have, consistent with this position, argued that the images of West­
ern society, including its advertising, are entitled to some of the 
credit for the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.2^ -pjie point here, of course, is not the truth of the claims 
about the impact of messages, but the perception of that impact 
and the rhetorical use of it in rendering markets more open or 
closed. 
Constitutional rules like article 19 in India, the First Amend­
ment in the US, the Television Without Frontiers Directives, and 
other international human rights conventions like the European 
Convention play a special role in limiting the cartelization of the 
market for loyalties. These provisions — constitutional, treaty, or 
basic laws — are essentially curbs on the power of a local political 
cartel to use law and regulation to screen out voices that seek to 
alter the current power structure and especially those that seek to 
use broadcasting, despite the cartel's power to force such change. 
How these documents are used — or not used — is the subject of 
an essay in this volume by Mark Templeton. 
Taking the market for loyalties approach seriously, broadcast 
reform would look to countries that face similar problems in pre­
serving (or modifying) the cartel and employ the tools found suc­
cessful in those other places. Those in charge of the cartel of 
loyalties would want to find devices to place the power of destabi­
lizing images in what are deemed safe hands. Safe hands might be 
local hands, corporate hands, or transnational hands; but the ques­
tion would generally be whether those hands are as non-threaten­
ing as possible. 
The rhetoric of broadcasting reform is, almost by definition, 
different from the substance of broadcasting reform, except in a 
few limited instances. Few modern and democratic governments, 
or participants in policy making, would articulate a policy of regu­
latory reform saying explicitly that it was designed to keep theni in 
power. An authoritarian society with a monopoly on information 
and which represents itself as an authoritarian society might have 
little difficulty marrying rhetoric to reality, ^eats to the monop­
oly must be defeated, and making that explicit may be part of the 
ideology of control. 
25 See e.g., SUBCOMM. ON INT'L OPERATIONS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 102D 
CONG., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON U.S. GOVERNMENT INTERNATIONAL 
BROADCASTING (Comm. Print 1992). 
1997] MARKET FOR LOYALTIES 455 
In most modern societies, however, the elegant language of 
democracy and openness must be observed even while pursuing 
the restrictions and cartel-producing results that would be predict­
able in most markets for loyalties. This is so for several reasons. 
First, each era has its style and vocabulary in statutes as well as in 
dress and modes of living. Ours is a style of openness, pluralism, 
and freedom to receive and impart information. With very few na­
tional exceptions, the style is used to the extent possible in back­
ground documents, speeches, findings, and prologues to statutes 
where that technique is used. Second, the rhetoric or style of open­
ness is, as indicated above, itself a tool of seeming inclusion.^^ This 
is the Orwellian point: the political use of language to cover behav­
ior that is its opposite. Finally, the substance of restriction may 
ultimately be tested in the courts as well as in the court of public 
opinion. The language of openness may be considered part of a 
strategy to convince courts that an otherwise restrictive statute falls 
within the norms of a constitution or international convention. 
II. INDIA, THE BROADCASTING BILL AND THE MARKET FOR 
LOYALTIES 
What are the implications of this approach for understanding 
the Indian Broadcasting Bill? As various accounts in this volume 
suggest, much of the history of broadcasting and the press in India 
is consistent with the market for loyalties theory of broadcasting 
regulation. The delay in introducing television, the delay in invest­
ing in color television, the extremely close relationship between 
Doordarshan and the Government, the delay in implementing 
Prasar Bharati, the ban on uplinking, and the virtual prohibition of 
private terrestrial broadcasters are all consistent with the notion of 
control of the balance of the voices in the society. 
Despite the invocation of Western models and precedents, the 
implicit strategy of the Broadcasting Bill is to adopt those devices 
available to restrict competition as well as those measures neces­
sary for reasons of technology, public opinion, and constitutional 
requirement to allow new entrants. Such a strategy, under a mar­
ket for loyalties" analysis, is the outcome of rational behavior by 
those in power seeking to maintain it. Such a strategy is necessarily 
26 Some argue that freedom of expression and openness can even be seen as an ideol­
ogy, used or abused by different groups in society. See, e.g., Fredrick Schauer, The First 
Amendment As Ideology, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853 (1992). 
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antecedent to the search for statutory language (including statutory 
models from abroad) that will enshrine the new arrangements. The 
world's regulatory practices then present a tool kit which can be 
examined for techniques and instruments that will together be 
thought to bring about the desired result. 
Given a definition of national identity based on a defense of 
power by those in control, there are strong implications for any 
media legislative reform, including the Indian Broadcasting Bill. 
Those responsible (at the highest level) for drafting and adopting 
broadcasting reform would introduce just such pieces of "reform" 
legislation that perform the function desired. In the case of the 
Broadcasting Bill, if an important function is posited as protecting 
an existing cartel of loyalties against new challengers, then many of 
the additions are readily explicable. 
For example, one debated issue in the Indian Broadcasting 
Bill concerned cross-media ownership. An important part of that 
debate dealt with the expansion of the power of newspapers 
through acquisition of television licenses. A cross-media owner­
ship rule that curbed these newspapers could have been and was 
framed in terms of frustrating monopolies. But the rule could also 
be read as assuring some effort to support a status quo in the distri­
bution of political power. Barred from ownership of television sta­
tions, newspapers that represented a particular point of view or 
segment of a coalition could not gain additional power. The issue 
would be decided against a background in which there is question 
whether newspapers have too much influence within parties and 
whether the larger newspapers and the parties they represent, if 
they expand, will break the balance of relationship with smaller 
parties or other forces within the society. 
The effect of provisions in the Bill on the internal balance of 
political forces was augmented by the effect on that balance of 
what might be called "external influences." Here the licensing of 
DTK providers and satellite channels comes into play. The critical 
point is not the direct effect such television might have directly on 
the young, but, in a stronger sense, the extent to which such televi­
sion loosens the hold of the existing political hegemony. Foreign 
signals — or foreign content — may be thought to break down 
loyalties to significant aspects of the existing power structure. 
Some groups might object to foreign signals on principle, but 
they might also realize that, for reasons relating to that principle, 
over time images have power to wean people from their prior alle-
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giances. If this threat is deemed sufficiently grave it could lead to a 
joint effort by otherwise squabbling internal forces who agree to 
put aside their differences; whatever coalition exists internally 
could be undone if the new television incorporates influences so 
powerful that they shake most previously conceivable iterations of 
the status quo. 
It is quite easy, then, to look again at the 1997 Indian Broad­
casting Bill in the light of this analysis. The most potent threats to 
the existing cartel, the dominant voice of those in power, are said 
to be the foreign satellite television broadcasting services. While 
most of the rhetoric has been about this source of challenge, the 
Bill is more comprehensive. Because newly issued terrestrial tele­
vision licenses could be extremely potent challengers as well, they 
might have more immediate access to homes than those dependent 
on cable television with its monthly and additional charges and 
may represent indigenous political forces that have obvious and 
passionate, information-hungry constituencies. Similarly, cable tel­
evision could be a threat if it were organized such that cable opera­
tors had wide choice as to what should appear on the television 
screen. All of these are subject to regulation and control as to 
entry. 
The Broadcasting Bill, whether purposely or not, seems 
designed to deal with influences that could be seen as hegemony-
threatening institutions. Television licenses would be granted by a 
broadcasting authority so composed that it is itself a reflection of 
the hegemony and certain to be sensitive to its needs. The foreign 
equity prohibition is another reflection of this attention to the spe­
cial power of terrestrial broadcasting licenses. Cable television is 
not only subject to a license itself, but all programming on its chan­
nels can be taken only from licensed sources. And the cultural in­
vaders are dealt with through the uplinking requirement and the 
foreign equity caps. Cross-media ownership prohibitions and re­
strictions on the number of licenses can be read as establishing 
legal barriers to the accumulation of significant media power by a 
dissident to challenge effectively the dominant voice of Doordar-
shan and other participants in the hegemony. 
But the legislation not only restricts, it expands the number of 
voices, altering or legitimating the existing alteration of a previous 
status quo. Is such an expansion consistent with the "market for 
loyalties" theory? The answer lies in how the law determines who 
is a favored entrant and why. Law, here, can only act as an indica-
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tor of intention; the actual administration of the law will determine 
how the expansion takes place. The Broadcasting Bill, for example, 
somewhat controversially excludes religious organizations from 
gaining ownership of a terrestrial license, perhaps because of a fear 
that the power of television and the power of religion, together, too 
considerably facilitates the development of an uncontrollable and 
effective base of challenge. 
It is here, too, where the composition of the regulatory author­
ity becomes important, as it is in all societies. The chapter in this 
volume by Professor Prosser underscores this point. There is rarely 
anything like complete "autonomy" in such agencies charged with 
issuing licenses and determining whether the terms of such licenses 
are being met. But in terms of fidelity to the "market of loyalties" 
analysis, it is important to determine how controlled and how sub­
ject to the influence of the governing structure the authority might 
be. 
Virtually no law can wholly exclude programming from 
abroad. As S. Jaipal Reddy, the Minister of Information and 
Broadcasting, has said, India will not be King Canute, seeking to 
hold back the waves. The incapacity to exclude, however, means 
finding a way to legitimate and, at the same time, limit an opening 
that has the inherent capacity to control. The proposed Broadcast­
ing Bill accomplished this in several ways. The primary method 
was to require uplinking within India for signals that would be di­
rected to an Indian audience (either through cable, direct broad­
cast, or DTH delivery). Unabashedly, this was thought to be a 
necessary element of control, an opportunity to have a physical ca­
pacity to block, censor, or discipline an entity involved m program­
ming that was considered forbidden. 
How does DTH satellite delivery of television channels figure 
in this under the Broadcasting Bill? Foreign ownership aside, 
DTH is often deemed to provide the greatest challenge to the ex­
isting cartel in the market for loyalties. It appears beyond reach 
though it may not be. It appears to be outside the tradition of legal 
controls over physical matter, though, again, that may be solely be­
cause of undue apprehension. Since it would be inconsistent with 
the desirability of the new rhetoric to exclude DTH as a competi­
tor, a second strategy would be to provide a mechanism m which 
delay is a likelihood, or one in which the DTH system would go to 
a favored provider along the lines of the Malaysian model in which 
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MEASAT, with close ties to the Government, received a virtual 
DTH monopoly. 
The viability of a nation-state depends in part on its ability to 
invent and nourish national traditions. India, at the time of the 
Broadcasting Bill debate, was about to celebrate its fiftieth anni­
versary of independence. However complex the nature of that cel­
ebration, it would be immediately comprehended that weakening 
Doordarshan was against the nation-building vein. In India, the 
difficulties of nation building are linked to the history of broadcast­
ing and are reflected in other essays in this volume. It was useful to 
the nation if television provided or nourished new mythologies, 
new leaders, new histories, or new narratives, and it would be use­
ful if it could continue to do so. But processes of transformation 
require central direction; that is why harnessing media in the pro­
ject of change has always been a governmental objective in India as 
well as elsewhere. 
III. THE INEVITABILITY OF COMPARATIVE MEDIA LAW 
All this leaves the very difficult question of assessing the na­
ture of broadcast reform in the comparative paradigm. Is media 
law so country specific, so tied to the mores, history, political struc­
ture, regulatory style, and state of the creative industry in a particu­
lar place that influences from other contexts are only marginally 
helpful? Or, on the contrary, is media law, especially in interna­
tional societies, so much a part of an increasingly transnational 
whole that any attempt at identifying sharp local differences, 
unique in style and outcome, is virtually doomed? This essay has 
been an effort to develop and apply a comprehensive theory — one 
that has implications in each setting. There is, however, a related 
mode of comparison: the actual importation of chunks of law from 
one setting to another. The industry that exists in transferring me­
dia law expertise from one place to another certainly claims to per­
form a function far different from the one that we have so far been 
discussing. 
Thus far in this chapter, the emphasis has been on what we 
learn from comparative media law analysis about the kinds of strat­
egies that governments follow when they believe that the national 
identity that has achieved a sufficient degree of political stability is 
threatened. But this is not the whole story. Media law and policy 
seem to be like a set of interchangeable machine parts; the ways 
states deal with problems that are common to many or all of them. 
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It is as if there is an inventory of applications; the task of the expert 
is to identify a country or countries with a similar attitude toward 
the degree of openness in speech, find the bit of law that deals with 
the particular issue involved (e.g., cross-media ownership or con­
trol of obscenity), and then help to retool or modify that bit for 
adoption elsewhere. 
In the post-Cold War world, this task of discovery and trans­
ference has been institutionalized and, at least with respect to Cen­
tral and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, financed by 
supplier governments. The US AID in the US and the Know How 
Fund in the UK are examples of this approach. Both have pro­
vided grants or contracts to experts to help use national donor ex­
pertise to assist in fashioning the media structures in the newly 
independent or transitional states. Why is this the case? The ex­
port of broadcasting systems from the West is deemed important 
because of a deeply held belief that a democratic media under the 
rule of law is central to the development of a democratic society. It 
may also be an aspiration by the exporting country that the adop­
tion of a particular style of system of legal regulation will result in 
continued relations and the export of television product. In the 
case of India, the process of providing technical assistance was not, 
however, a function of foreign governments, nor did it need to be. 
The Ministry itself and technicians of the Government engaged in 
research to determine appropriate models abroad. In addition, 
assistance on these questions have come from the multinational 
broadcasters themselves, not well-meaning British or French or 
American public agencies. 
Just as there is a functional value to government proponents of 
foreign models, the same is true for advocacy by private groups. To 
be sure, transnational companies often cite those examples from 
abroad that serve their purposes. But they also have a broad inter­
est in consistent and well thought-out legislation of varied impact. 
It is important, for example, for businesses that are transnational to 
face government approaches in different national contexts that are 
as similar as possible. Those companies that seek to do business 
globally and want to program regionally desire, appropriately, to 
have some common vocabulary, some common approaches in the 
absence of a supranational authority. There is a stake in having 
common language in statutes, and common philosophies in en­
forcement. These transnational companies need predictability in 
terms of investment and in terms of the consequences of program-
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ming decisions. Overlap, consistency, the evolution of common 
forms of regulation — all of these lead to efficient and, perhaps, 
better products. 
Foreign models can, of course, provide standards which are, 
though non-binding, influential assessments of what responsible of­
ficials elsewhere, presented with similar problems, have done. As 
has been indicated, one of the principal examples of the invocation 
of foreign law as a model in the Indian Broadcasting Bill debate 
was the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Ministry of In­
formation & Broadcasting v. Cricket Ass'n of Bengal in 1995.^^ Not 
only did the decision purport to rely very strongly on American 
and European precedents, but the documents surrounding the 
presentation of the Broadcasting Bill, which repeatedly cited these 
precedents as if they were influential, perhaps compelling, had 
been absorbed by the policy makers rather than merely reiterated. 
Justice S. Jaipal Reddy's opinion dealt with the exploration in Eu­
ropean and American jurisprudence of the rights of viewers and 
listeners as opposed, as it were, to the rights of broadcasters. He 
was relying on interpretations of human rights and constitutional 
provisions from abroad not because they were binding, but because 
they provided insight from highly respected individuals who held 
positions similar to his own, dealing with fundamental documents 
much like article 19 of the Constitution of India. Where there was 
a consensus among interpreters, and where that consensus has 
gained added sanction from being incorporated into international 
documents, they were found to be influential. 
Justice Reddy used the Hero Cup case to rethink article 19 
doctrine, to use modes of analysis that had arisen elsewhere, and to 
determine whether it should be used in the interpretation of the 
Constitution of India. This was a great and creative use of foreign 
models: not mechanically, not to further a particular private or car­
tel view, but rather, in a reasoned way, to determine an alternate 
idea of speech and the role of government. Justice Reddy's Hero 
Cup opinion emphasized that Parliament and the Government 
were mandated by the Constitution to restructure Doordarshan 
and AIR so that they would be under an autonomous public au­
thority — roughly the result of the then-shelved Prasar Bharati law 
— and also to have a form of media architecture that permitted 
independent competition with the government outlets. 
27 Secretary, Ministry of Info. & Broad, v. Cricket Ass'n of Bengal (1995) 2 S.C.C. 161. 
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These are all considerations — strategic, modular, analytic — 
which seem to militate in favor of the extensive use of comparative 
models. Yet, without question, some aspects of media law are spe­
cifically local and tied deeply to their context. In India, concerns 
about religion and media are very different from those in the US or 
Europe. It is not possible to take media-related rulings that stem 
from the Establishment Clause of the American Constitution and 
import them, uncritically, into the Indian (or other) setting. Lan­
guage, too, has extraordinary variables that are so tied to social 
structure that media rules concerning them have to be dealt with 
carefully. The Canadian approach, for example, to the decentrali­
zation of language rules, and the policies which govern language 
use in broadcasting, can be influential; but powerful cultural, social, 
and political differences need to be taken into account. 
There are ways, moreover, in which the complexities, technical 
details, and the very structure of media laws arise out of a specific 
tradition. In the US, there is a complicated relationship between 
rules, licensing, and sanctions for the violation of rules. When the 
fairness doctrine existed and was in full force, for example, it was 
not enough to know the content of the doctrine; its true meaning 
could only be understood by knowing when and whether the FCC 
enforced it, how much of a sanction would be imposed, and 
whether violation of the doctrine would be relevant at the time of a 
license renewal. The fact that renewals are now almost automatic, 
itself, would change the dynamic of a rule's meaning. Thus, at 
times, societies that enforce a rule readily and harshly (say, closing 
down a newspaper for violation of a rule against obscenity) con­
sider that they are adopting a standard that exists in another place. 
But rules come conditioned with an entire cohort of conditions, 
assumptions, and rules for enforcement. A true adoption does not 
take place — and maybe never can take place — without bringing 
the surrounds along with the actual rule. 
One other point should be made. No matter what is actually 
said, however deferential or absorbing a society seems to be to 
models from abroad, the greatest source for law is internal to the 
country. Even in the most difficult transitions — those from the 
authoritarian Soviet regimes to the democratic democracies — 
what went before was highly relevant to what went after. Lan­
guage, mode of thinking, and regulatory perspectives are ingrained 
and inherent. Even where models are specifically adopted — say, 
the model of the BBC for an autonomy of public service television 
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— old habits of relationships between governments and bureaucra­
cies cannot easily be avoided. In the Indian Broadcasting Bill, and 
in Prasar Bharati, not only the years of independence, but the years 
of colonial administration provide a backdrop to the design and 
implementation of the regulatory authority. The chapters of Se-
vanti Ninan and Nikhil Sinha underscore this point. 
What is fairly clear, however, is that in a period of globaliza­
tion, when technology and the changes that technology mandates 
have so substantial an impact on practices around the world, com­
parative approaches become essential. The impetus for knowledge 
about another country's practices in media regulation becomes al­
most as important as knowing generally about another country's 
practices in trade. Regional approaches to media imagery, the im­
pact of multilateral agreements and investments on media prac­
tices, and the very requirements of those participating in the 
market all require a process of borrowing or coordination. It is in 
that sense that comparative law studies become inevitable. The 
only question is how thoroughly they are conducted and how the 
complex aspects of the context in which media laws are embedded 
are understood. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Lurking behind all of these issues relating to the use of com­
parative models is another more difficult question: whether tech­
nology — especially transborder technology like satellite and the 
Internet — intrinsically confounds and resists law, making law a 
negotiation between state and supplier rather than an order from 
government to citizen. This question is frequently posed in terms 
of whether or not there is some degree of technological determin­
ism that makes legal reforms that are not sensitive to them virtually 
irrelevant. On the Internet, this question has arisen in the context 
of regulating obscenity or defamation and also adopting a regime 
that would assure that the copyrights or intellectual property rights 
of authors and programmers are properly recognized and that com­
pensation for those rights is efficiently enforceable. Already in the 
US, the Supreme Court has struck down — though not on the un­
principled grounds of technological determinism — congressional 
efforts to regulate the Internet to prohibit certain "indecent pro­
gramming" directed to or available to the young. Vagueness, the 
availability of alternatives, and, in some sense, the very spirit (this 
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resistance to law) of the Internet frustrate the imposition of certain 
legal standards. 
Domesticating the Internet, which has had a regulation-free 
and transnational beginning, is one of the obvious challenges or 
threats and seems quite difficult.^® But the situation may be the 
same for maintaining the domestication of broadcasting structures 
that are increasingly like (if not converging with) the Internet sys­
tem. Here, one may put aside the necessary aspects of regulatory 
machinery, such as technical aspects of spectrum allocation or even 
the mechanics of licensing. These aspects of law ordinarily follow 
industrial precedents, often, in fact, incorporating agreements 
among the affected businesses which are then enshrined into law. 
But even those attributes of law that are deemed pertinent to a 
particular evocation of national identity — regulation of foreign 
investment, quotas, content norms, and other aspects of law which 
affect the distribution of television, its availability and cost to large 
numbers of citizens — are increasingly beyond national power. 
These laws that seem exceedingly important to a culture may be 
hard to shape and harder to enforce. It is these provisions that are 
often invoked by reference to other laws, but where the very avail­
ability of law in a global society is most questionable. 
Throughout the enterprise, dealing both with the new technol­
ogies and the old, not only the translation of words, or even of 
concepts, but the translation of deeply engaged settings and toe 
machinery of administration must be taken into account. The 
words of article 19 of the Constitution of India or the First Amend­
ment to the US Constitution, for example, are embedded m the 
music of their context. For people working in this area, a senous 
28 Some have suggested that in the case of the Internet, as an international phenome­
non only a unique set of international treaties can effectively serve to regulate the new 
services. This view overlooks, however, an important part of the namre of the interna­
tional community. The international community can agree and act quite decisively where 
there is a common consensus about values to be protected and the means necessary o 
protect them. Sec, e.g., Concerning Problems of Criminal 
Information Technology, Recommendation No. R(95)13 (visited Oct. 10, 199p p. 
www.privacy.org/pi/intLorgs/coe/info_tech_1995.html> (representing a regiona multilat­
eral effort by the Council of Europe to increase levels of cooperation m myestigation of 
computer rules). Likewise, the international community becomes powerless to effect 
change where such consensus does not exist or breaks down as a consequence of differe 
cultural sensitivities (e.g., the regulation of poUtical speech, obscenity, etc.). M^eoven m 
some countries the concern is more cultural and especially Unguistic: there are fears a^ut 
English language-dominated information services. The same can be said m the case of 
transnational approaches to regulate broadcasting. 
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problem involves the portability of these magic constitutional 
words or their continental equivalents. It is sometimes difficult for 
those from Washington or Boston who market the First Amend­
ment in Kiev, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, or Budapest to understand 
or translate the complexities of its adaptation. One cannot talk of 
"judges," of "neutral principles," or of "accountability of govern­
ment officials to a rule of law" without sensitivity to the differences 
that may unravel the hidden meanings of these terms. 
Even sophisticated experts, schooled in the relativism of an­
thropology and sociology, find it hard to sort out the comparative 
aspects of all these questions and to help determine what element 
from the bundle of historically enacted statutes should be adapted 
to what context. It is easier to conclude that laws and institutions 
come in ready-made, almost modular packages, such as model stat­
utes or constitutions. Various units for archiving and evaluative 
analysis automatically come to mind. These include the persistence 
of a monopoly in state television, the existence of prior censorship 
of the press, arbitrariness and corruption in frequency allocation, 
and recognition of the rights of journalists. Examination of the for­
mal framework can also focus on depoliticizing the appointment of 
chief executive officers of public service broadcasters, broadening 
the composition and appointment of supervisory or regulatory 
bodies, and applying the rule of law to the decisions of government 
agencies. 
The post-modern, post-critical, post-legal realist is more than a 
naturalist working with cabinets stuffed with statutes, pinned like 
butterflies under glass. To examine change formally, there is the 
project of chronicling specific statutory drafts and laws, country by 
country, organizing them by category, and engaging in a textual 
analysis comparing proposed and achieved transformations in one 
state to those in another. But far more is necessary, far more un­
derstanding, far more in terms of context, far more in terms of 
matching the legal equivalents of modern technology to the situa­
tion at hand. 
